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Making No Secrets About It
REED E. HUNDT*
When Big Government cajoles Big Companies to share Big Data,
the question inescapably follows: What should be the governing rules
for digital information?
Law, regulation and norms relating to the analog world-that
which people see, hear, smell, touch, and taste-do not translate well
to the digital world. Everything that can be known is being
memorialized in the domain of electromagnetic signals that codify
information in volume too vast and patterns too complex for humans
to understand. The five senses have no presence in the digital world.
Flesh and blood people can send messages-queries, instructions,
information-into the digital network of circuits and electromagnetic
waves. Responses come back: the restaurant expects you and your five
senses at 8 p.m. and here are the directions to get there.
But behind the response, in the near infinitude of electrical
circuits, no human can even pretend to keep up with the digital
collection and use of information. All information can be recorded,
and almost all soon will be, in the computers of the digital domain.
"Information" must be meant as any observation, transmission,
calculation or memorialization. The information may relate to
something at rest (the restaurant door recorded by a surveillance
camera, the restaurant's seating chart and menu) or in motion (a
tweet about the menu, a credit card payment for dinner). It will
include, in Peirce's taxonomy, evidence of "signs," assumptions about
"objects," and the provision of "interpretants." '
* Reed E. Hundt is the former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. He
currently sits on the boards of a number of technology companies, including Intel
Corporation, and is an attorney in Washington, D.C.
1 See ' The Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms," Commens, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html.
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The networked computers of the digital domains not only preserve
the "signs," but they draw conclusions about the "objects" to which the
signs relate: with that prix fixe meal, amuse-bouches are to be
expected. They constantly seek and create patterns from which they
draw conclusions ("interpretants") of at least two kinds: what caused
an action to occur in the past and what is causing actions probably to
occur in the future. People have gone to this restaurant because they
know it serves pat& off the menu and under the table; people will
continue to go because San Francisco has banned pat&. The computers
know everything that can be known. They also opine and predict. They
will keep their views to themselves or share them with humans, at
least in simplified form.
The computers keep most of their data to themselves because the
volume of digital data is too large for any person to review within the
span of human life. The computers manage that data too quickly for
any human to follow by hand or eye. Humans can understand the
digital domain only in two ways: in theory and in the practical form of
receiving answers to questions (yes, that particular San Francisco
restaurant offers pat& off the menu).
Some may draw the corollary that humans should be indifferent if
machines turn every sign and symbol of an individual's "thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions"2 into computer code. No one needs to be
concerned about computers knowing everything about everyone.
Similarly, you should not worry if the shining sun sees you lounging
naked in your back yard. If some are not much troubled by learning
how much data lies in data banks, they may believe humans have a
right of privacy only as against the intrusions of other humans.
The digital domain may well be as inaccessible and mysterious as
the stars. It may operate under rules as seemingly irrelevant to our
analog world as Einsteinian relativity. Yet when the nuclear reactors
of Fukushima melt down, the most abstruse laws of physics have
manifold impact on the world that humans do feel with their five
senses. When the digital domain intersects with the analog, its vast
power can completely alter the way we live. Humans, or at least those
possessing state-granted authority, can command that point of
intersection. They can and do decide when and how the digital will
have impact on the analog, when and how the opinions and
predictions of the digital domain will lead to inquisition or
incarceration in the physical world. Because the digital does impact
the analog, none of us should be unconcerned about what computers
know about us. Only machines should be indifferent to machines.
2 Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy," Harvard Law Review 4,
no. 5 (189o).
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I argue here that the doyens of the digital domain, comprised of
big businesses with big access to nearly infinite data and big
government with nearly overwhelming persuasive power, are crafting
the operational rules for governing digital information. Constraining
the government's behavior is, as since the beginning of the United
States, the Constitution. But the companies, courts, Congress, and the
Executive Branch are reinterpreting our rights for the digital domain.
However, secrecy, in both corporations and the government, makes
the rules difficult to discern.
Based on what little we humans (can) know, the emerging
practices and constitutional interpretations applicable to the digital
domain are likely to allow government to make more errors in
preventing criminal acts or apprehending bad actors than will be
acceptable to the sense of justice most of us hold. Under the
developing practices for digital information, government will be
allowed to use information for ends that most individuals would find
unacceptable, even repugnant, potentially edging toward tyrannical.
Further, the currently developing practices for big government's use of
big data will lead to staggering expenditures of taxpayer funds. That in
turn will cause the government to delegate its tasks to big data-
collecting companies, turning them into satrapies of the central state.
If allowed to flower, such corporatism would prove destructive to both
economic and social freedom. Finally, I argue that government and
private sector secrecy about the current rules enhances these three
risks: error, misuse, and corporatism. If any or all of these trends
develop, they will cause a deterioration of the trust relationship
between any American and the government.3 Without trust among
individuals, firms, and the state, even the most effective police force
cannot assure a coherent, well-functioning society.
No one involved in the technological breakthroughs that raise
these possibilities wants a part in creating such a dystopian future.
Almost all want to preserve for Americans, if not the whole world,
what playwright Tom Stoppard called "autonomous freedom, the
freedom to think for oneself, to use one's discretion .. .to apply
common sense, and common humanity."4 Therefore, for the purpose
3 To quote Richard Thaler: "Trust is really important in society, and anything we can do to
increase trust is worthwhile. There's probably nothing you could do to help an economy
grow faster than to increase the amount of trust in society." See Douglas Clement,
"Interview with Richard Thaler," The Region, October 3, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://wwv.minneapolisfed.org/publications-papers/pub display.cfm?id=5184.
4 Tom Stoppard, "Tom Stoppard: Information is Light," The Guardian, October 11, 2013,
accessed January 26, 2014, http://wvww.theguardian.com/stage/2o13/oct/11/tom-
stoppard-pen-pinter-lecture.
2014]
VS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
of such preservation, the new rules should be identified and debated.
Better rules should be adopted than those being put in place. The
Constitution should be applied to the digital domain, not in hoc verba,
because those 18th century precepts do not translate clearly,' but in
practical ways that continue to protect everyone who is relatively
powerless against those who are relatively powerful.
What, then, are the current rules? At the appellate level, the large
mobile carrier, Verizon, is now arguing that no law or regulation can
govern access to the digital domain.6 Verizon claims that the First
Amendment does translate from analog to digital, and that it anoints
Internet access as a kind of apostolic successor to the printing press.
Because Verizon provides access to the Internet and the near
infinitude of digital information therein, it is like a newspaper with a
printing press that provides access to analog information. Hence, no
government can make any law that constrains Verizon's behavior.
Specifically, Verizon can decide who has access at what price (a
newspaper can decide to whom it should sell and at what price). And
Verizon can decide what to give access to (a newspaper can decide
what to print). Verizon can choose, for example, what emails to send,
on the other hand a newspaper can decide what letters to the editor to
print.
This argument mistakes conduit for content, according to the brief
on behalf of Susan Crawford, a well-known law professor, and me.7
Verizon is a newspaper delivery truck, but not a newspaper or a
printing press. Analogy, it seems, is the way that law maps the analog
world of the drafters of the First Amendment to the digital domain.
Analog values, like autonomous freedom, as well as analog objects like
"printing presses," also must be restated in forms that make sense in
the fusion of digital and analog experience that is the way we live now.
5 In an interview published October 6, 2013, Justice Scalia said as to originalism, "Words
have meaning. And their meaning doesn't change." See Jennifer Senior, "In Conversation
Antonin Scalia," New York Magazine, October 6, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://nynag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013- o. However, technology can alter
what words mean. When the Bill of Rights was adopted, purple meant to most people a
color verging on red. Then in 1856, William Perkin invented a synthetic dye that made a
more bluish color widely marketed and sold as "purple," the commercial success of which
effectively shifted the meaning of the "purple" toward mauve. More recently, Facebook
seems to have changed "friend" into a verb with evolving connotations.
6 Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission, No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. January 14,
2014).
7 See Susan Crawford, "Verizon v. FCC: Why It Matters," Captive Audience: The Telecom
Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age, September 8, 2013, accessed
January 26, 2014, http://scrawford.net/verizon-v-fcc-why-it-matters.
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Without waiting for the court of appeals or Congress, Internet
access providers (primarily telephone and cable companies) and over-
the-top-of-Internet-access companies (Google, Facebook, Amazon,
Yahoo, and others) are creating and following new rules to the digital
domain. I will call these firms "OTT," for "over the top." I will call the
access providers "carriers."
The carriers keep track of the parties, geographic location and
duration of all digital communication.8 They could ask the computers
in their networks to examine and save the content of communications
but as far as I know, they do not. Almost all digital communication
goes over one or more of the networks owned by a mere handful of
carriers.9 For many years, these carriers have shared with government
what they know about digital communication, sometimes after
receiving warrants, and sometimes without such formality.0
The OTT firms (think: Gmail, Instagram, PayPal) transmit words,
pictures, numbers. They use the carriers' networks, but while
transmitting the content they can and do have their computers review
it. They save what they choose to save, which is a lot. They presumably
believe, like the carriers, that the First Amendment bars government
from interfering with their content practices. But as of this writing, no
OTr firm has chosen to be the protagonist in a digital version of the
Pentagon Papers case." I suspect that none wants to reveal how it
gathers information or how skimpy the proof of consent is from all of
us who provide the information.
Besides, the OTT firms' case would not align them with the public
interest. In Pentagon Papers, the newspaper championed the public's
right to understand its government's actions against the government's
attempt to keep its conduct secret. 2 In opposing the government's
efforts to get its hands on the OTT's firms' information about the
8 Siobhan Gorman and Devlin Barrett, "White House Weighs Options for Revamping NSA
Surveillance," Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2014, accessed March 5, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424o527o23o388o6o45794o564o6244o97
48.
9 See Warren Grimes, "Competition Will Not Survive the Comcast-Time Warner Merger,"
Forbes, February 27, 2014, accessed March 5, 2014,
http://wwv.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2o14/o2/27/competition- wllnot-survive-the-
comcast-time-warner-merger/.
10 "Google Transparency Reports," Google, accessed April 9, 2014,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests.
1 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
12 See ibid.
2014]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
public, the OTr firms would be arguing that their own largely secret
data gathering is privileged over the government's secret actions.
13
They would not be contending that they are the agents of individuals
who use their services. If they invoked a right of privacy, it would be a
business's right to keep its practices secret from users, customers and
competitors. Although such self-interest would not prejudice their
claims in court, it would hardly inspire trust between the OTT firms
and the users who provide the information which makes the firms
successful.
For decades the government has been able to learn from carriers
the location, parties and duration of telephone calls. It also has been
able to wiretap lines and listen to conversations. Often government
has obtained warrants in order to hear content, but not always. 4 This
is because half or more than half of all global telephone
communication went to, from, or through the United States,
government in this country has also been able to eavesdrop on the
bulk of global traffic. Other obliging countries presumably have filled
in such gaps as existed. But in only the last few years has the
government been able to collect and review the substance of almost
every communication." Here again, the global reach of American OTT
firms has enabled the American government to take a look at much of
the world's digital content. Technological breakthroughs, more than
executive or judicial action, have enabled these developments.
Technology has preceded law. Law has been obedient to what is
technologically possible; law has also been perplexed about
technology, worried about taking any action that might enable another
9/11, and incapable of conceiving of a new paradigm for the digital
domain.
13 See Federal Communications Commission v. AT&T., 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011) for a failed
attempt.
14 "In Practice.. An American's communication could be read without a warrant, another
U.S. official says." Siobahn Gorman and Jennifer Valentino-Devries, "New Details Show
Broader NSA Surveillance Reach," Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2013, accessed January
26, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI00014241278873241o820457902287409173247
0.
15 he system has the capacity to reach roughly 75% of all U.S. Internet traffic..." Ibid.
See also James Risen and Laura Poitras, "N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of
U.S. Citizens," New York Times, September 28, 2013 (' The agency can augment the
communications data with material from.., commercial and other sources, including bank
codes, insurance information, Facebook profiles, passenger manifests,... and GPS
location information, as well as property records and unspecified tax data...").
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In the United States, and worldwide, a small number of big firms
have garnered huge market shares in search, on-line media, digital
payments, and other sorts of digital communications. The rise of
Google and its ilk has enabled the American government to think big.
If the American OTT firms had not been able to seduce from users all
the information imaginable, government could not have considered
the uses it might make of this data. 6 Certainly government could
never have gathered so much data about so many dimensions of
human activity if the big companies had not obtained that data from
users. The rise of the big firms has also narrowed the group with
which the government has had to negotiate in order to get almost all
information it can imagine it wants. The government can make offers
these firms cannot refuse.
Nor could anyone in government have made much use of the data
but for the technological breakthroughs in storage, retrieval, and
calculation that commercial innovators have produced. A decade ago,
microprocessors were neither fast enough nor cheap enough to store
and analyze the volume of digital information generated in America,
much less worldwide. Moore's Law, the prediction that
microprocessing would double in performance or drop half in price
every two years, 17 has enabled government and the really big OTT'
firms to save and analyze even the vast quantities of digital
information that Americans now create and consume. Computers now
have programs that permit them to analyze data without first
organizing it into columns and rows. Other programs permit
computers to learn from their own mistakes. Still other software
divides requests (do people really like the pat& served under the table
at that restaurant?) into discrete tasks to be performed by many
different computers, as a result of which answers are delivered when
they matter (yes, go ahead and order that pat& right now!). 8 Progress
i6 In many countries, government has long cemented the symbiotic relationship between
telecommunications firms and government's desire to monitor communications by taking
ownership stakes in the firms or by tightly regulating such firms. The OTT firms, however,
have risen to become the chief data mongers in an era of privatization, in which the United
States government, among others, has argued against mixing public and private capital in
the same entity, on the grounds that such ownership distorts efficient market conduct. For
this reason, government in the United States and philosophically aligned nations has been
using tools other than ownership to obtain access to the data gathered by OTT firms.
17 See "Moore's Law or how overall processing power for computers will double every two
years," Moore's Law, accessed April 9, 2014, http://www.mooreslaw.org.
18 See Michael Hickins, "How the NSA Could Get So Smart So Fast," Wall Street Journal,
June 12, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424127887324o495o4578541271o2o66566
6.
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in antennas, wireless transmission, drones, satellite cameras, facial
recognition, smartphones, and many other technologies have
extended further the scale and scope of digitizing and gathering
information.
As a result of the new combination of big firms, big data and big
government, government now routinely asks computers to suggest
who has committed crimes. The government also asks computers to
predict criminal activities at specific locations, and requests that
computers identify people who intend to commit crimes. 9
Presumably, government instructs the computers to generate lists of
threats on a continuous basis, ranking them according to
probabilities. The computers do machine learning; that is, they
constantly refine their analytical skill. The humans in charge of the
government's digital domain of course hope the predictions are
accurate. But they cannot know for sure how reasonable the
computations are," and short of wrestling admissions from every
identified suspect, they cannot validate every prediction.2' Some of the
criminals, in the past and predicted in the future, are terrorists; that
is, some hideous fervor drives them to kill civilians and destroy
facilities integral to society. But we are not discussing here only
terrorist activities. That category is too permeable and broad. The uses
of the digital domain for analog police work are too plentiful for
government to resist applying them to any and all criminal matters.
So this is the way the digital domain actually works. We assume.
Little by little newspapers, still putting ink on paper for fingers to
touch and eyes to see in the analog world, are reporting the vastness of
its reach. Little by little, individuals are grasping that the government
is well on the way to becoming the panoptieon22
What does this tell us about the application of the Constitution to
the digital domain? If we want to be grounded in the emerging reality
19 See "Don't Even Think About It," The Economist, July 20, 2013, accessed January 26,
2014, http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582042-it-getting-easier-foresee-
wrongdoing-and-spot-likely-wrongdoers-dont-even-think-about-it.
20 See George Dyson, "NSA: The Decision Problem," Edge, July 27, 2013, accessed January
26, 2014, http://www.edge.org/conversation/nsa-the-decision-problem ("In modern
computational terms... ,there is no systematic way to determine, in advance, what every
given string of code is going to do except to let the codes run, and find out.").
21 If suspects are apprehended before they commit the act the computers say they intend -
exactly what anti-terrorist efforts try to do - then the ultimate proof of accurate prediction,
namely, the deed itself, is obviously never provided. See ibid ("The ultimate goal of signals
intelligence and analysis is to learn not only what is being said, and what is being done, but
what is being thought.").
22 Jeremy Bentham's late 18th century design of a building where a watchman could secretly
observe the behavior of all occupants. See "Theory of Surveillance: The Panopticon,"
Cartome, June 16, 2001, accessed April 9, 2014, http://cartome.org/panopticoni.htm.
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of governmental conduct, at least some of the amendments we call our
Bill of Rights should be read with the modifications stated below:
First Amendment: But the Government can learn where and how
you worship, what you say, and with whom you meet or communicate.
Second Amendment: But the Government can discover who has
bought Arms and can keep track of those persons.
Third Amendment: But the Government can "quarter" virtually in
any house, "without the consent of the Owner," technologies that
permit the Government to learn any digitized activity by any person or
by any device owned by any person.
Fourth Amendment: But the Government can search any device
recording digital activity by any person, without obtaining a warrant
or having any reason to believe any such person has committed or
intends to commit any criminal act; Government can copy any record
of any person's digital activity.
Fifth Amendment: But Government can place anyone under
examination, as many times and as long as a computer declares such
likelihood of having done, or possibly intending to do, a crime. Any
person's digital information can be used against such person.
Government can take and hold any person's digital information
without any process of law specific to such person: a general mandate
as to a class of persons or information suffices to justify any taking. No
one has a property interest in any digital information at least as
against government's possession of such information, no matter how
obtained. At least until and unless the Supreme Court decides more
cases involving digital information, the rights of individuals in the
digital domain at least appear to be curtailed in these procrustean
ways. The capabilities of big firms and big government currently are
paramount as to digital data.
So what can go wrong? The answer depends on motive,
competence, and constraints.
The carriers profit from transmitting the most information and
seeking bottleneck pricing power over access. Saving and analyzing
information is a cost they cannot recover, save in respect of learning
better ways to send information. They do share freely with
government, but they do not collect and store much content, at least
as far as we know. Their motives to misuse digital data are limited;
their competence is fairly high; they face constraining regulation at
the FCC and in state regulatory authorities.
OTT firms, like the government, use digital data about past
behavior in order to predict each person's future behavior. On the
strength of that prediction-who might go to a particular restaurant,
what might they order?-they sell placement to advertisers. The OTT
firms will give anything away for free or nearly for free (operating
systems, maps, news) in order to attract attention to the free material.
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Knowing the proclivities of those whose attention is thus captured on
a screen the firms control, they sell to advertisers the opportunity to
present, visibly, on the handheld or desktop screen, the specific goods
and services they wish to sell to those whose previously gathered
information suggests are likely to buy these categories of goods and
services.
Supposedly it was 1 9 th century merchant John Wanamaker who
said, "Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I
don't know which half."23 Many of the OTT firms aim to persuade
modern day Wanamakers that in return for money they can reduce
the waste by reporting exactly who saw the ad and then made the
purchase.
Perhaps in the near future, OTT firms will also use the information
they have gathered from all of us to provide answers to questions
(what is the increase in my probable mortality before 70 if I eat that
pat )? in return for money. But for now, the principal use is to provide
advertisers solutions to the Wanamaker problem. OTT firms are
hoisted on their own digital petard, however, because the digital
domain also records patterns that seem to show the causal connection
between advertising and purchase. As a result, OTT firms face the
traditional constraint of capitalism. If they do not perform for their
customers-give accurate predictions-then their customers can go
elsewhere.
The government wants to use the same data for predictions. It is
predicting not consumer purchases but criminal acts. However, the
techniques of storing and analyzing the data are much the same for
predicting both the benign and the malign acts of humans.
Now we come to the problem of error. The carriers' information
(called "metadata") permits the government to assemble a narrative of
a suspect's behavior. But its predictive capability is low. The OTT
content is richer, more useful, but it neither is nor needs to be perfect
in its forecasting. If OTT firms are 75 percent accurate, or even 65
percent accurate, in predicting possible purchases, they offer much
better value to advertisers than other media. If the government's
predictions of terrorist activity were as far off as that, however, they
would be of little use. Moreover, when it comes to the conviction of
perpetrators of crimes, government needs to be even more accurate.
Did someone steal the pat&? What does the camera in the kitchen
show? Government needs proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
23"Quotation Details," The Quotations Page, accessed April 9, 2014,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/1992.html.
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computers managing the digital domain will struggle to give this level
of accuracy.24
Even if the percentage of accuracy in prediction is 95 percent, the
false positive problem is huge. Assume a population of 300 million,
and assume terrorists number 1,5oo. Assume further the computers
identify all the terrorists. The problem is that the computers will
include in the identification 5 percent of 300 million, or 15 million
people. So of those, one out of every lO,OOO will be a terrorist; for
every terrorist, about lO,OOO people will be misidentified as
terrorists." Given that these overbroad predictions are made every
day, in short order millions of Americans would be identified as
terrorists. Misuse of information is of course possible for both OTT
firms and government. Anyone at an OTT firm might leak information
to those who want to harm the reputations of those surveilled. An OTT
firm might follow the bad idea of selling personal information-like a
private investigator in the analog era taking photos of cheating
spouses. But the market really will mete out quick and serious
punishment to OTT firms that misuse information. Trust is the key to
the relationship of individuals to OTT firms. Moreover, individuals
can have recourse to civil action if and when an OTT firm causes harm
in ways cognizable as slander or defamation.
Misuse of data by government is potentially far more draconian
and subject to almost no remedy. Misuse by the government means:
(a) disclosure that causes reputation and/or career harm to the
innocent, (b) threat of disclosure that in turn silences opposition,
competing points of view, dissent, and so threatens democracy's
successful functioning, or (c) false arrest based on unjustifiedtargeting.2 These are not the effects of misuse that OTT firms are
likely to cause. We can assume with good grounds that the
24 Law avoids stating its time-honored verbal standard in mathematical terms, but perhaps
95% probability is "beyond a reasonable doubt." See Jon 0. Newman, "Quantifying the
Standard of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Comment on Three Comments," Law,
Probability, and Risk 5 (2oo6), 267-69, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://lpr.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/3- 4/267.full.pdf.
25 See Corey Chivers, "How Likely is the NSA PRISM Program to Catch a Terrorist?"
Baynesian Biologist, June 6, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://bayesianbiologist.COm/2013/o6/o6/how-likely-is-the-nsa-prism-program-to-catch-
a-terrorist/. See also Carl Bialik, "Ethics Aside, Is NSA's Spy Tool Efficient?" Wall Street
Journal, June 14, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI000142412788732404950457854354225805488
4.
26 See Barton Gellman, "U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes Collection of Revealing
Internet, Phone Metadata," Washington Post, June 15, 2013 ("[NSA data] can...expose
medical conditions, political or religious affiliations, confidential business negotiations and
extramarital affairs.").
2014]
VS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
overwhelming proportion of government actors with access to the
nearly infinite data of OTT firms do not intend any such harm. But it
is said that more than a million people have access to classified
information.27 As the Snowden case illustrates, all kinds of people
appear to know a lot about what government, through its computers
at any rate, knows. And we don't have to go back farther than the
Nixon Presidency to get a history lesson on the potential for data to be
used for political purposes that make a mockery of democracy.
In sum, OTT firms have reasonably benign motives for wanting to
obtain, store and analyze digital records of everything knowable in the
world. They do not need to be completely competent in their
predictions and yet can still add much value to the economy. They face
meaningful checks and constraints on their potential misuse of
everyone's data. The harm OTT firms are likely to do even in dire
circumstances can be addressed by civil action and marketplace
reaction.
By contrast, government's motives may be of the highest nobility,
but government includes within its walls so many people that some
surely harbor ill intentions on occasion or are merely clumsy in
handling private information. Under current rules and practices,
bad government intentions are not, in the digital domain, much
constrained. Nor can government be expected to predict with truly
refined accuracy the bad acts intended by terrorists, or any criminals,
from computer processes alone. Finally, under the current actual
practices in the digital domain, checks and constraints on government
misuse of data are not commensurate with the sort of harm to
innocents that government action can inflict.
Now let us turn to the next category of difficulty: expense. The
more data gathered by winning OTT firms, the more profits they
make. The more data gathered by government, the more costs go up.
There are no incoming streams of revenue to be obtained by
government. Of course, if government can forfend a terrorist attack by
obtaining predictions from databases, the savings measured in lives
and also impact on the economy may be incalculable. A budget
27 Nicholas D. Kristof, "How Could We Blow This One," New York Times, July 3, 2013,
http:///www.nytimes.cOm/2013/07/04/opinion/kristof -how-could- we-blow-this-one.html
("some 1.4 million people (including, until recently, Snowden) hold 'top secret'
clearances.").
28 Ezra Klein and Evan Soltas, "Wonkbook: Two Gamechanging NSA Stories You Must
Read," Washington Post, August 16, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2o13/o8/16/wonkbook-two-
gamechanging-nsa-stories-you-must-read (NSA broke privacy rules or overstepped legal
authority thousands of time every year since 2008).
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problem remains: there is no way to link the benefits of stopping
crime with the cost of preventing it.
The OTr firms can be left to strike their own compromises with
how much data to gather and the cost of collecting, storing and
analyzing it. Typically the lines are crossed with respect to storage.
OT firms do not much need old information. When the data is old
and cold, they will throw it away. Government would like to hold all
information forever, because sleeper cells and clandestine agents
might spend years formulating their plots. But storage is not free.
Moreover, OTT firms tend to specialize. By contrast, in
government, agencies compete on the basis of gathering similar
information for similar purposes. It is possible that one person
running one entity will emerge as the steward of all government data;
certainly General Alexander of the National Security Agency would be
the leading candidate as of now. But when he retires in 2014, or when
a new President arrives in 2017, there is no telling what person or
agency may become the leading data analyzer. This governmental
competition can provide Presidents with useful conflict in points of
view and judgment. But it can lead to astonishingly expensive
duplication in the digital domain.
In any event, the volume of data is growing too fast for almost any
government, and perhaps even the extraordinary American
government, to manage. It is said that 9o percent of all digital
information was created in the last two years.2 9 In the next two years,
even a greater volume will swell the data centers of the world. Few if
any countries can afford to keep up. Perhaps only America and China
can manage the data desired for national security purposes. Then, the
United States may offer allies a digital umbrella, under which any
participating nation can get access to the predictive capabilities of the
American security system. They will be expected to use their police
forces appropriately to apprehend suspects. In a system not unlike but
far less dangerous than the nuclear umbrella erected in the Cold War,
the United States could become a global peacekeeper without nearly
the number of boots on the ground, and without the casualties that
have come from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, not even the United States can afford to gather, store
and analyze all digital data.g° Private firms simply must cooperate with
29 See Leslie Bradshaw, "Big Data and What It Means," U.S. Chamber of Commerce
Foundation, May 28, 2013, accessed January 26, 2014,
http://emerging.uschamber.com/library/2o13/o5/big-data-and-what-it-means.
30 See Ian Welsh, "The Logic of the Surveillance State," Ian Welsh, June 9, 2013, accessed
January 26, 2014, http://www.ianwelsh.net/the-logic-of-the-surveillance-state/ ("The
problem with surveillance states.. .is the cost.. .both direct, in the resources that are
required, and indirect in the lost productivity and creativity...").
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government. If America is to offer its digital security capabilities to
allies, then OTT firms in those allied countries also must cooperate in
collecting and managing data.
At present, OTT firms are leery of being involved with
government. Many of the larger OTT' firms joined together in
December to write a letter protesting existing government data
collection.3 But government needs that access, and the firms need
governmental protection against cybersecurity threats. Therefore, the
compact between OTT firms and government must be renewed, under
new rules. Those who are surveilled-the people who provide the
data-can seek a seat at the table in this negotiation.
Now we move to the ultimate problem: secrecy. As the late Senator
Pat Moynihan wrote in his brilliant book by that name, secrecy in
government is a form of regulation.32 It is a rule that alters other rules.
Specifically, secrecy impairs the rule against misuse of data and
exacerbates the problem of expense.
When the government's activities in the digital domain are secret,
motives and competence are not subject to beneficial scrutiny. Bad
actors in government are far less likely to be sussed out when few,
even in government, know who knows what about whom. The
problems of inaccurate predictions and false positives are not even
likely to be admitted, when secrecy precludes the problems from being
discussed. No one will try to fix these problems, if wrong predictions
are as likely to be acted upon as right ones; yet under conditions of
secrecy that will be the case.
You might say that the agency with the data will do the checking.
But everyone needs a boss to force thorough reviews from time to
time. With secrecy there are not many bosses, if any. This is what
various Senators have been saying for some time about the data
gathering in the Executive Branch.
Secrecy also limits human judgment. If hardly anyone has
sanctioned access to information, then hardly anyone can debate
decisions in front of, say, the President. The individual who reports
what the computers have concluded is who holds the single trump
card. It may be the Queen of Spades in a game of Hearts, but secrecy
does not permit anyone to know what is really on the card.
Secrecy also increases expenses in at least two ways. Agencies
whose activities are largely secret from each other do not know how to
31 Dan Roberts and Jemima Kiss, 'Twitter, Facebook and more demand sweeping changes
to US surveillance," The Guardian, December 9, 2013, accessed March 4, 2014,
http://wvww.theguardian.com/world/2o13/dee/o9/nsa-surveillance-tech-companies-
demand-sweeping-changes-to-us-laws.
32 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Secrecy (Yale, 1998), 59.
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share resources, and secrecy within government also exacerbates
competition among agencies. In the private sector, consumers benefit
if Microsoft secretly develops a faster, better, cheaper version of an
Apple product. But in government, taxpayers pay more, not less, when
agencies try to outdo each other.
The ultimate detriment of secrecy is that it inspires distrust
between the governed and their government. Since the founding of the
United States of America, the citizens of our country have had more
reason to believe in the good intentions of their government than, say,
the Russians or the Chinese. But the United States was not founded on
the assumption that citizens simply must trust their government.
Indeed, the opposite.33 The Constitution, especially as amended by the
Bill of Rights, is very much about constraining government in order to
make it trustworthy.
When Americans do not know what government knows about each
person, or what it does with that knowledge, distrust will surely be on
the rise. Eventually, there is a tipping point. When enough people
distrust the government on enough topics for long enough a time,
there is no police power that can prevent that same distrust from
affecting all social and business relations in society. The country will
fall apart. It has happened to other countries; it is not impossible for
distrust to be the cancer that kills the American idea.
These are some, if perhaps not all, the reasons why the new rules
that are emerging are not good enough for the long run of the digital
era. These rules are not terrible first drafts. For example, it is probably
best for private firms to gather digital information from each of us,
rather than having government do it directly, as General Alexander
seemed to suggest he would prefer.34 But they are only first drafts.
Here is an outline for a next draft of the governing rules of the digital
domain.
Secrecy enhances both misuse and expense. Here is what should
be open either to individuals or to society, as appropriate:
a. Any individual should be able to know everything that
an OTr firm knows about that person. This may
encourage some to opt out of OTr data collection
efforts. Then, security forces can focus limited
33 See Peter Shane, Madison's Nightmare (Chicago, 2009).
34 See Gorman Siobhan, "NSA Chief Opens Door to Narrower Data Collection; Gen. Keith
Alexander Gives Unexpected Option: Surveillance Could Target Only Terrorism-Related
Data," Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2014, accessed April 9, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424o527o23o4o710045794o95827153o681
4 for General Alexander's most recent take on possible practices for the programs.
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resources on the class of opt-outs, which is more likely
to include bad actors, actual or potential.
b. Any individual should be able to know whether the
government has identified that person as a suspected
criminal any time in the past, up to five years ago. If so
identified, that individual should be able to go to a
court to seek exoneration and receive a monetary
payment for the intrusion on his or her privacy if there
was no reasonable basis for the government's
conclusion. This should constrain government excess,
reduce cost, and improve trust, at least a little (as well
as accuracy).
c. Everyone in society should be able to know in the
abstract what the government is doing-not whose
phone numbers and emails the government thinks are
revealing a crime, but the fact that there are categories
of such information being gathered. This will improve
trust and accuracy and permit a debate about
appropriate expense.
d. Everyone in society should know clearly where digital
data is gathered and who in the government is using it.
There should be one central data gathering agency.
There must be clear accountability. Responsibility for
good stewardship must lie in named people, not in
"government" writ broadly and ambiguously. Those
responsible for misuse of data must be held
accountable.
e. The public should have access to records of all
Presidential knowledge of surveillance results within
five years of a presidential term ending, or lo if need be
shown to a court to keep secrets longer. This
information will improve the quality of reports to the
President and constrain the likelihood of inappropriate
requests by the President or staff.
A bureau of declassification should constantly reduce the amount
of information treated as secret. Hardly anyone should be allowed
security clearances that permit access to conclusions from digital data.
The second step is to institute safeguards against abuse:
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a. Those who have access to conclusions from the
government's digital data banks should have term
limits. We do not need a digital era Hoover. Five-year
terms would suffice; it is particularly important to
minimize the political power of the executives running
the government's digital domain by increasing the
likelihood that they will not serve much longer than a
Presidential term.
b. We should expand the requirement for the government
to obtain warrants for obtaining certain information.
The process of getting a warrant focuses the
information gatherers.
c. The judiciary should have access to a standing technical
oversight committee to review the methods and
accuracy of government's digital domain. This sort of
committee serves most expert agencies; judges should
have the same sort of technical advice.
d. Individuals who have good grounds to believe they
have been wronged by government misuse of data
should be able to have a lawyer appointed for them to
investigate what has occurred.
e. Defense lawyers should be able to examine the
accuracy of what the government's digital domain
concludes and predicts.
f. Government officials should face criminal sanctions for
intentional misuse of data from the digital domain, and
civil sanctions for unintended misuse.
g. Monetary awards should go to any individual who can
prove that digital data about that person, regardless of
how obtained, was misused by government or a private
firm. Consequential damages should be allowed. No
punitive damages or attorney's fees should be awarded.
The third step is to constrain the expense of managing the digital
domain:
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a. The government and the private sector should enter
into an agreement of cooperation the terms of which
are public.
b. The government should obtain continuous technical
advice on efficient data storage and retrieval practices
at use in the private sector. If government does not
choose to adopt best commercial practices, it should
explain its reasons to a select Congressional committee.
c. The United States should propose the creation of a
global anti-terrorism cyber task force. All participating
nations should contribute to defray the expense.
The rules for the digital domain must enable government to try to
uncover and prevent criminal activity of all sorts, especially terrorism.
At the same time the rules must balance trust between individuals on
the one hand and data-gathering firms and the government on the
other. To achieve this balance, the government should operate under
rules that minimize secrecy, not security. We want less secrecy and
greater security, not the opposite. Part of security is the protection of
individuals against abuse, intentional or accidental, by data-gathering
firms and the government. Every person needs to know that in the
digital domain, as well as in the analog world in which the
Constitution was written, the government protects the less powerful
from the more powerful.
The dystopian modification of the Bill of Rights outlined above
need not necessarily emerge as the prevailing jurisprudence of the
digital age. Many cases have yet to be decided. The Supreme Court is
still far from stitching together a coherent doctrine for the digital
domain. However, it is high time for Congress to curtail the spread of
secrecy in government culture. It is past time for Congress to establish
safeguards against governmental abuse of digital data. Congress
should not wait for the Judiciary before giving individuals the right to
know what private firms and the government know about each person,
and giving the public in general the right to know what sort of
information in the abstract that the government is gathering. By
taking these steps, Congress will assure that the Constitution
continues to underpin our cherished ideals of freedom even if we find
ourselves living, speaking, and being remembered in the digital
domain.
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